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IN THE SUPREME C01URT 
O,F THE STATE 0'F UTAH 
PLC LANDSCAPE 
CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PICCADILLY FISH 'N CHIPS, INC. 
Def end ant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
12607 
APP'ELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant is the owner of a recently constructed 
restaurant located at 1810 Washington Blvd. in Ogden. 
Near the time of completion of construction of said 
restaurant, defendant was contacted by plaintiff, a 
landscaping company, regarding the possibility of 
plaintiff providing the landscaping and exterior design 
for the restaurant. Negotiations commenced between 
the respective parties wherein various proposed de-
signs and prices were discussed. The parties finally 
agreed upon a specific plan and price and entered 
into an oral agreement. At trial defendant contended 
that the original agreement called for payment to 
plaintiff of the sum of $4,581.30 with defendant furn-
1 
ishing the services of the resident manager of the res-
taurant as general labor to assist in the landscaping. 
Plaintiff maintained that the original agreement was for 
payment of $4,581.30, but defendant was to provide 
considerably more labor than could have been per-
formed by the resident manager. During the course of 
performance of the contract, various additions, de-
letions and modifications were made in the landscape 
design, apparently under an agreement that the con-
tract price would be later adjusted by mutual agree-
ment. After the landscaping had been completed, the 
respective parties met to adjust the contract price but 
could not come to an understanding concerning either 
the value of the extra work performed or the amount 
of labor to have been provided by the defendant. The 
defendant acknowledged that its restaurant manager 
had not been available to work fulltime on the land-
scaping as previously planned and agreed to pay 
plaintiff the reasonable value of his services during the 
two-week period of performance of the agreement at 
the rate of $50.00 per day. Defendant also agreed to 
pay plaintiff for the contract modifications which de-
fendant maintained had a reasonable value of ap-
proximately $400. Defendant thereafter paid the plain-
tiff the sum of $5,500 as full compensation for the 
work performed. Plaintiff thereafter demanded pay-
ment of an additional $1, 169.53, alleging that the total 
price of the work and materials furnished was 
$6,669.53. Upon defendant's refusal to pay the ad-
ditional $1, 169.53, plaintiff commenced an action to 
recover that amount. 
2 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried in Ogden on the 24th day of 
June, 1971, before the Honorable Calvin Gould, one 
of the judges of the Second Judicial District. At the 
conclusion of plaintiff's case, the court took under 
advisement defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, said motion being based on the premise that 
plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case. On 
June 28, 1971, Judge Gould entered a Memorandum 
Decision finding the issues in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant with judgment against the de-
fendant in the sum of $1, 169.53 plus costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment entered 
by the District Court and an order remanding the case 
with direction that appellant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment be granted with costs to the appellant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
1. The court erred in failing to grant defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment because plaintiff 
failed to meet the required burden of proof. 
A. Plaintiff elected to proceed under the 
theory of quantum meruit rather than ex-
press contract. 
B. Plaintiff's evidence failed to establish the 
reasonable value of the materials and 
labor provided. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. The court erred in failing to grant defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment because plain-
tiff failed to meet the required burden of proof. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
made when plaintiff rested its case was taken under 
advisement and apparently the court never expressly 
ruled on the Motion independent of the entire case as 
nothing is stated concerning the Motion in the Memo-
randum Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, or Judgment. Only the first 87 pages of the trial 
transcript, comprising the plaintiff's entire case, need 
be considered in determining the merits of defend-
ant's Motion. 
A. Plaintiff elected to proceed under the 
theory of quantum meruit rather than ex-
press contract. 
Plaintiff's complaint does not allege the existence 
of an express or implied contract with the defendant 
wherein or whereby defendant agreed to pay either a 
fixed price or fixed rate for work and materials sup-
plied by plaintiff. The complaint merely states that 
the "Plaintiff did work for the defendant in the amount 
of Six Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Nine and 53/100 
Dollars ($6,669.53) .... " 1 There is no allegation 
that defendant agreed to pay that amount, only that 
"Defendants refuse {sic} to pay the balance due on 
1 Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 2. 
4 
the open account and plaintiff should receive 
$1, 169.53 together with interest. 112 
In order to define and narrow the issues of fact 
and theories of law involved in the case, this matter 
went to pre-trial before the Honorable John F. Wahl-
quist on May 26, 1971. At the pre-trial hearing Judge 
Wahlquist asked plaintiff's counsel to "Tell us your 
theory and what evidence you have. 113 In response, 
plaintiff's counsel outlined his case and then, in re-
sponse, to the inquiry regarding the theory of recov-
ery stated: 
We are going ahead on the basis of the fact 
that the work was in fact done and the reason-
able value of the work would be the total 
amount claimed. 4 
The court then further inquired: 
On a quantum merit [sic} or final bid type 
agreement pact? 
To which plaintiff's counsel finally replied: 
... it's a quantum merit [sic} theory. 5 
Plaintiff's counsel was then directed to prepare a pre-
trial order and to "state briefly in it this theory of your 
action that you have outlined here. 116 
2p1aintiff's Complaint, paragraph 3. 
JReporter's Transcript of Proceedings in Pre-Tria.1, dated May 26, .1971, 
before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, page 2, lines 4-5. (Hereinafter 
cited merely as "Transcript of Pre-Trial Hearing") 
4Transcript of Pre-Trial Hearing, page 2, lines 28-30. 
5/d. page 3, lines 1, 10. 
6/d. page 6, line 30 through page 7, line 1. 
5 
Because the matter was not tried before Judge 
Wahlquist who had presided at the pre-trial hearing 
and because a written pre-trial order was not prepar-
ed, defendant's counsel in opening remarks indicated 
to the trial judge that plaintiff had previously elected 
and defined his theory of recovery as quantum me-
ru it. 7 
Plaintiff, therefore, having elected to proceed in 
quantum meruit is bound by that theory and great in-
justice would result if the court then allowed recovery 
on any other theory. In the case of Taylor v. E. M. 
Royle Corporation, 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P2d 279 
1 
(1953), this Court, in an opinion written by Justice 
Henriod, reversed a decision in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court wherein the lower court granted relief 
to a plaintiff on the theory of quantum meruit even 
though plaintiff did not plead that theory either initi-
ally or by amendment. Justice Henriod explained: 
. . . a defendant must be extended every 
reasonable opportunity to prepare his case and 
to meet an adversary's claims. Also he must be 
protected against surprise and be assured 
equal opportunity and facility to present and 
prove counter contentions, else unilateral j~s­
tice or injustice would result sufficient to raise 
serious doubts as to constitutional due process 
guarantees. 
7Reporter's Transcript of Trial before Judge Calvin Gould, June. 2.~· 
1971, page 3, lines 14-18. (Hereinafter cited merely as "Trial Transcript l 
6 
"Here the record indicates that the plaintiff had 
an express contract in mind, not one implied in 
law. Plaintiff sought no change in theory by 
way of pleading or proof. We believe an injus-
tice would result if the rule were interpreted to 
charge the defendant with liability under quan-
tum merit [sic}, an issue he was never called 
upon to meet. 8 
If, therefore, the court is to allow plaintiff recov-
ery in this case, or, more specifically, if the court is to 
properly deny defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, it must do so on the basis that plaintiff presented 
a prima facie case under the theory of quantum meruit. 
It cannot be on the basis of an express contract. 
The two vital elements comprising a prima facie 
case in an action seeking recovery under the theory 
of quantum meruit are proof of performance of the 
services and the reasonable value thereof. 
In an action of this character [quantum me-
ruit} the vital elements which the plaintiff must 
prove in order to establish a prima facie case 
are the performance of services and the rea-
sonable value thereof. 9 
In order for defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment to have been properly denied, it must therefore 
appear from the record that plaintiff established a 
8264 P2d at 280. 
9 Evans v. Mason, 308 P2d 245 (Ariz. 1957). See also, Wysowatchy 
v. Lyons 137 Colo. 578 328 P2d 576 (1958); Manford v. Coats, 6 Cal App. 
2d 743. '45 P2d 395 (1935); 58 Am. Jur. §62 "Work and Labor," p. 560. 
7 
prima facie case by proving both the performance of 
the work and the reasonable value of the work per-
formed and materials supplied. 
B. Plaintiff's evidence failed to establish the 
reasonable value of the materials and 
labor provided. 
Plaintiff indicated in opening remarks its intent 
to call "Mr. Smith, an independent landscape archi-
tect who will testify about the reasonableness of the 
charges which we [plaintiff} made." 10 Mr. Smith's 
background and record includes the following: 
1. Employed as a landscape contractor for J. 
& L. Garden Center in Centerville, Utah for 
14 years. 
2. Contracts landscape work and does com-
petitive bidding. 
3. Visited the restaurant site approximately 
three weeks before trial - that date being 
almost one year after the work had been 
performed at a time when considerable 
annual plants had been replaced and 
which were not part of plaintiff's land-
scaping. 
What followed in the form of proffered testimony 
by Mr. Smith as an "expert" witness concerning the 
"reasonable value" of the materials supplied and 
work performed is nothing more than dialogue of eva-
sive, ambiguous and uncertain statements and re-
1 or rial Transcript. page 3, lines 7-9. 
8 
sponses. It is not defendant's contention that Mr. 
Smith's testimony was erroneous or ill-founded. We 
do not contend that what he said was not true. It is 
what Mr. Smith did NOT say that concerns us and has 
legal significance. Thorough examination of the very 
brief testimony of this, the only independent witness 
who testified or who was called to testify on plaintiff's 
behalf concerning the reasonable value of the work 
and labor performed, indicates that he NEVER DID 
IN FACT SO TESTIFY in that regard nor tell the court 
the reasonable value of said work and materials. 
Mr. Smith immediately evidenced his scarce 
familiarity with the problem at hand and also foretold 
his own ignorance of any detail concerning the work 
when plaintiff's counsel asked him if he had an op-
portunity to "survey", implying more than a casual 
observation, the subject premises. 11 Mr. Smith re-
plied that he had made only a "visual observation on 
the site" and had "reviewed a little bit the plans." 12 
When asked if the work on the plan (plaintiff's Ex-
hibit "A") was actually done, his response was "As 
near as I could tell." Mr. Smith was, however, unable 
to follow plaintiff's counsel's lead concerning "addi-
tional work" and testified that he was not "aware that 
there was any extras." 13 When asked about specific 
items and the total bill, moreover, it became apparent 
that Mr. Smith did not know if all the work on the plan 
had, in fact, been completed. 
1 l /d. page 8, lines 1-2. 
12/d. page 8, lines 3-6. 
13/d. page 11, lines 9-13. 
9 
0. You don't know whether all of the plants 
listed on the plan were actually planted on 
the premises? 
A. No, that was not my purpose .... ' 4 
And later: 
0. There may be some work drawn on the 
plan that was not in fact done? 
A. That's very possible. 15 
Plaintiff's summary of charges which it attempts 
to collect from defendant and as enumerated on plain-
tiff's Exhibit "B" page 2, item 3 and Exhibit "F" in-
voice No. 40038 shows a total charge for tractor and 
hand grading at $181.25. Plaintiff's counsel tried to 
get Mr. Smith's opinion as to the reasonableness of 
that charge, but Mr. Smith denied comment thereon 
since he could not determine how much work was 
actually done. 16 
Plaintiff's summary also indicates a rather sub-
stantial charge in the sum of $1, 183.65 for "fences". 
But in response to inquiry into what factors were taken 
into consideration in valuing the labor and materials 
comprising the fence work, Mr. Smith confessed that 
he had no background in fence work and acknowl-
edged that he did not even attempt to value that work 
His statement was: "We did not figure the fence, I 
14/d. page 13, lines 26-30. 
15/d. page 17, lines 13-15. 
16/d. page 8, lines 22-28. 
10 
presume it is part of it, but it had nothing to do with 
the part I was figuring." 17 
Again, plaintiff's bill attempts to impose a charge 
of $1,096 for combined cement work. (Items 4 and 9 
of Exhibit "B" page 2 or Exhibit "F" invoice No. 40038) 
With regard to this labor and material, Mr. Smith did 
not know that a large part of the total bill involved ce-
ment work, 18 did not do cement work in his busi-
ness, 19 did not know whether the general contractor 
who built the restaurant or the plaintiff who did the 
landscaping put in the concrete20 , and as far as Mr. 
Smith was concerned, it was not his responsibility to 
compute whether the price charged was reasonable 
in light of the cubic yards of cement work actually 
done. 21 Hence, on four specific items (grading work 
- $181.25; wishing well - one of the contract "ex-
tras" which Mr. Smith was "not aware of", $150.00; 
fencing - $1, 183.65; and concrete - $1,096.00) 
totalling $2,610.90 or roughly 40% of the total 
$6,669.53 charge submitted by plaintiff, Mr. Smith was 
entirely unable or unwilling to testify concerning their 
reasonable value. 
On the other items where, with some stretch of 
the imagination, it could be said Mr. Smith by impli-
cation testified as to the reasonable value of materials 
1 7 fd. page 15, line 30 through page 16, line 1. 
1 Bfd. page 16, lines 14-16. 
19/d. page 16, lines 11-12. 
201d. page 16, lines 22-24. 
211d. page 17, line 5. 
11 
furnished, he also admitted that prices on several 
items vary according to their quality and that he did 
not know what specific grades of materials were actu-
ally used. 22 
What Mr. Smith did say concerning the prices 
and charges sought to be imposed by plaintiff is so 
ambiguous as to be wholly meaningless. Indeed, 
plaintiff's counsel tried to elicit a clear and concise 
statement as to the value of the items listed - he 
tenaciously pursued Mr. Smith trying to extract one 
firm commitment, one straight-forward response to 
the real issue - "What is the dollar value of the mate-
rials and labor supplied by the plaintiff?" - but, alas, 
the task proved too arduous! Plaintiff's counsel first 
tried to lead softly into a commitment: 
Q. And in your review of the site, and the plan 
and the costs, did you find any discrep-
ancies? 
A. I didn't have any detail enough to deter-
mine whether there was so many square 
feet involved or anything like that. 23 
Plaintiff's counsel becomes more specific: 
Q. Specifically with respect to Piccadilly and 
that job, were there any items that you 
could see on the job or on the plan which 
would have required any unusual amounts 
as far as square footage is concerned? 
221d. page 14, lines 17-19; page 18, lines 19-20. 
23/d. page 10, lines 11-14. 
12 
But the response is again negative: 
A. I don't know, I couldn't give you any defi-
nite word. 24 
Undaunted, plaintiff's counsel tries again: 
0. Did you find that the bid and the work -
the bid that was made and the work which 
was done were in line? 
The "expert" replies: 
A. I had no way of determining this. 25 
Plaintiff's counsel decides to give it one last try. He 
begins to ask if the total bill is reasonable only to find 
out that the appraiser-witness does not even know 
what the total or final price was. 26 
In summary, what Mr. Smith did say is of little 
legal significance except as it indicates what he did 
not say. One searches his testimony in vain for any 
concrete evidence of the reasonable value of the ma-
terial and labor in question. 
The only other two witnesses who testified on be-
half of the plaintiff were Mr. Del Cook, one of plain-
tiff's former employees who was directly responsible 
for negotiating the original agreement, supervising the 
work and preparing the final bill, and Mr. LeGrand 
Grassli, Mr. Cook's immediate supervisor, who had 
24/d. page 1 O, lines 24-29. 
2s1d. page 11, lines 23-25. 
26/d. page 12, lines 1-6. 
13 
only minimal and for the most part secondhand knowl-
edge of the facts surrounding the case. Neither Mr. 
Cook nor Mr. Grassli addressed the issue of reason-
ableness of the trial figure set forth in the plaintiff's bill 
to defendant. But since the final bill is the only figure 
offered to the court as the reasonable value of the 
labor and materials furnished, we will consider the 
propriety and legal significance of said bill in estab-
lishing a prima facie case for recovery in quantum 
meruit. In preparation for trial of this matter and in 
an effort to "explain and detail exactly what was done 
in this case", Mr. Cook compiled the data shown on 
plaintiff's Exhibits "B", "E" and "F", the former two 
exhibits containing additions and deletions from the 
original bid and the latter being the final bill. Exami-
nation of said exhibits reveal that they are replete with 
contradictions, miscalculations, inconsistencies and 
error. When the items on the exhibits were listed and , 
compared side by side on a blackboard during cross 
examination, these inconsistencies became appar-
ent.27 Mr. Cook, who prepared the exhibits, repeated-
ly acknowledged the inaccuracies of his own work 
product. 
Q. Okay. Now the difference between 
$696.80 and $1,345.50 is roughly $648.00, 
and yet you only subtracted from the plant-
ing labor on Exhibit "E" $430.00. 
A. I would have to sit down and go through it 1 
like you did before I told you why or 
how.28 
27/d. pages 54-67. 
28/d. page 59, lines 23-27. 
14 
A. There is a discrepancy. There again, 
don't know why or how. 39 
0. . I can't subtract $183.00 from 
$1, 193.00 and get $800 in fencing. 
A. I see what you mean. 30 
A. Right. Again, I would have to check the 
figures to find out why. 31 
0. But, Mr. Cook, your figures just don't jibe. 
A. Again, this is what I don't understand, and 
I would have to, like I say, go through it. 32 
But assuming, arguendo, the inconsistencies 
could be reconciled, the fact remains that the only 
figures placed in evidence are those found on plain-
tiff's bill or demand submitted to defendant. The legal 
significance of the bill is not a difficult issue and can 
be disposed of summarily. 
The general rule of law is set forth in the case of 
Wysowatchy v. Lyons33 in which Iola Lyons filed a 
claim against the estate of Maude Lee, deceased, for 
services rendered to the decedent during her lifetime. 
29 /d. page 62, lines 11-12. 
JO/d. page 62, lines 24-26. 
31 /d. page 63, lines 7-8. 
32 /d. page 63, lines 29-30 through page 64, line 1. 
33 328 P2d 576 (Colo. 1958). 
15 
No witnesses testified as to the value of the services 
rendered by the claimant. The Colorado Supreme 
Court, in reversing a lower court decision allowing the 
claim, by citing an earlier decision held: 
The evidence offered to show the quality and 
the amount of service was meager, indefinite 
and unsatisfactory. Not a vestige of evidence 
was introduced to establish the worth of that , 
service, whatever it may have been. In the total 
absence of such testimony no part of the claim 
can properly be allowed. 
The claim on file has no evidentiary value and 
is merely the statement of a demand made 
against an estate to be proved in the same 
manner and by like evidence as would be re-
quired in other cases where one defends as an 
administrator. Accepting allegations of the 
claim as proof is to allow the claimant to prove 
her demand by her own pleading. 34 
34328 P2d at 576-77. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff elected to proceed in this matter under 
a theory of quantum meruit which imposes upon plain-
tiff the burden of proving the performance of the work 
and the reasonable value thereof. Plaintiff failed to 
meet that burden of proof and defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, made at the conclusion of plain-
tiff's case, should have been granted. The case 
should be remanded to the District Court with instruc-
tions that the judgment be set aside and that defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment be granted with 
costs to the defendant-appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG, POELMAN & FOX 
By)~.4:L~ 
HAROLD A. HINTZE 
Attorney for Appellant 
17 
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